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SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this note is to trace the development of the doctrine
of substantial performance, to examine this doctrine in its modern form,
and to consider the impact on this doctrine as applied in the sale of
goods of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Uniform Commercial Code
(hereinafter referred to as the U.C.C.) is now in effect in Wyoming and
is controlling with respect to commercial transactions occurring after
January 1, 1962 that fall within its proivsions. However, commercial
transactions effected prior to January 1, 1962, will still be governed by the
laws existing prior to the adoption of the U.C.C.
The act purports to deal with "commercial transactions" which is
deemed a single subject of the law, nothwithstanding its many facets. The
act is so drafted that it covers all phases which ordinarily arise in the
handling of a "commercial transaction" from start to finish. There is
some possibility that the U.C.C. will be applied in contract areas other than
sales by analogy.
DEVELOPMENT

OF THE

DOCTRINE

OF

SUBSTANTIAL

PERFORMANCE

At early common law to recover on a contract there had to be complete performance of conditions (including promissory conditions) and
it was not enough to show that the plaintiff acted in good faith and
substantially performed the agreement. 1 If a condition in a contract had
not been complied with, regardless if harm or inconvenience resulted, the
promisor was excused from performing and the promisee could not
recover. 2 This rule of strict performance was followed in building contracts, 3 sales contracts, 4 surety contracts,5 and personal performance contracts6 for many years. Some courts were strictly adhering to it as late as
1929. 7 A Washington court in reference to the rule of strict compliance
had this to say:
Later, however, it was realized that this strict rule (of compliance) was liable to, and often did, work a great injustice,
and at a somewhat early period the equity courts began to work
a relaxation of the common-law rule. Following the lead of
equity, the law courts soon began to recognize the justness of the
substantial compliance rule, and first applied it to building contracts, and at the present time it is almost universally held that
substantial compliance is sufficient in such contracts.8
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Glazer v. Schwartz, 276 Mass. 54, 176 N.E. 613 (1931).
White v. Price, 56 Ore. 376, 108 Pac. 776 (1910).
Carlson v. Sheehan, 157 Cal. 692, 109 Pac. 29 (1910).
Lombard v. Overland Ditch
and Reservoir Co., 41 Colo. 253, 92 Pac. 695 (1907) . Cutter v. Arlington Const. Co.,
268 Mass. 88, 167 N.E. 266 (1929).
Norrington v. Wright, 115 U.S. 188 (1885).
National Surety Co. v. Long, 125 Fed. 887 (8th Cir. 1903).
Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834).
Cutter v. Arlington Const. Co., 268 Mass. 88, 167 N.E. 266 (1929).
Harrild v. Spokane School Dist., 112 Wash. 226, 192 Pac. 1, 2 (1920).
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NOTES

There are many reasons why the common law requiring strict performance was relaxed and the doctrine of substantial performance was
instituted. One of the most important reasons for the relaxation of the
common law was to prevent the unjust enrichment that occurred through
the application of the rule requiring strict compliance. Thus, the doctrine
of substantial performance was primarily intended for the protection of
those who had faithfully and honestly endeavored to carry out their
contract, so that their right to compensation would not be forfeited by
reason of mere technical, inadvertent, or unimportant omissions or
defects. 9 This attitude is relected by the case of St. Charles v. Stookey in
the Ist Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Sanborn said:
When one has received the benefits of substantial performance
by the other without paying the price agreed upon, and he
cannot or does not return these benefits, it is manifestly unjust
to permit him to retain them without payment, or doing as he
promised. In order to avoid such an injustice, the party who has
substantially performed may enforce specific performance of the
covenants of the other party, or may recover damages for the
breach upon an averment of performance, without proof of
complete fufillment, while the other party on the other hand,
may by an independent action before he is sued, or by a counterclaim after the commencement of a suit against him, recover
from the first party the damages which he has sustained by the
latters' failure to completely fulfill his covenants. 10
Another reason for the relaxation of the common law rule was the
realization of the difficulty and improbability of attaining complete perfection in the quality of materials and workmanship called for my many
contracts.1 1 But, the principal reason for accepting the doctrine of substantial performance is still based primarily on the idea of trying to
prevent the unjust enrichment that resulted from the application of the
common law rule of strict performance.
The doctrine of restitution as a remedy at common law was not an
adequate or sufficient remedy for a substantially performing party. At
common law restitution meant the return or restoration of a specific thing
or condition; 12 this would not be practical or reasonable when applied to
a building or structure constructed on another's property or to personal
services rendered under a contract. It would be impossible or impractical
to restore the services rendered or to tear down and return a building.
This interpretation of restiution as a remedy was later changed. 13 Restitution is now the restoration of anything to its rightful owner; act of
making good, or of giving an equivalent for any loss, damage, or injury.'4
The measure of recovery generally in restitution is the reasonable value
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Williard Sales and Service Inc. v. Stevens, 167 Pa. Super. 621, 76 A.2d 225 (1950).
St. Charles v. Stookey, 154 Fed. 772, 776, 85 1st Cir. 494 (1907).
Dodge v. Kimball, 203 Mass. 364, 89 N.E. 542 (1909).
Holloway v. Peoples Water Co., 100 Kan. 414, 167 Pac. 265 (1917).
Holloway v. Peoples Water Co., supra note 12.
Holloway v. Peoples Water Co., 100 Kan. 414, 167 Pac. 265 (1917).
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of the plaintiff's performance and in cases of a plaintiff substantially
performing the recovery could not exceed the contract price since the
plaintiff would be in default. 15 Restitution would be a poor remedy for
the plaintiff in a situation where the prices or value of the services had
dropped before or at the time they were rendered since the basis of recovery
is their reasonable value at the time of performance. The use of the
substantial performance doctrine would prevent this loss as recovery is
based on the contract price.
THE DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANTIAL

PERFORMANCE

To allow a recovery upon substantial performance, the work must
be done in good faith, substantial, and not a deviation from the general
plan contemplated for the work. In a California case' 0 in 1894, the court
said that:
Good faith ...

is not enough

. .

. (as) the owner has a right to a

structure in all essential particulars such as he contracted for;
and, to authorize a court or jury to find that there has been a
substantial performance, it must be found that he has such a
structure.
Substantial performanec has been given various definitions by different
courts. A Wyoming court 17 said that:
Substantial performance of a condition precedent sometimes means
something distinctly short of full performance, in which case
recoupment may be had for the part not performed, but in other
cases means full performance according to the fair intent of the
contract and permits recovery thereon without recoupment.
The definition that is generally followed by courts is very similar to the
following definition given in Connell v. Higgins:'8
Substantial performance means that there has been no willful
departure from the terms of the contract, and no omission of any
of its essential parts, and that the contractor has in good faith
performed all of its substantive terms.
There is no set test to see if there has been a substantial performance
because this a question which must be answered in each case with reference
to the existing facts and circumstances.'
It is almost universally held that
certain general elements must exist in order to constitute a substantial
performance. Those generally required are: an endeavor in good faith
to perform, 20 the omission or defect must be unintentional or through
inadvertance, 21 the essential particulars of the contract must be met so
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Hertz v. Sayers et al., 32 Del. 207, 121 At. 225 (1923).
Perry v. Quackenbush, 105 Cal. 299, 38 Pac. 740, 742 (1894).
Pacific-Wyoming Oil Co. v. Carter Oil Co., 31 Wyo. 314, 226 Pac. 193, 198 (1924).
Connell v. Higgins, 170 Cal. 541, 150 Pac. 769, 775 (1915).
Connell v. Higgins, supra note 18.
J & L. Steel Co. v. Abner Doble Co., 162 Cal. 497, 123 Pac. 290 (1912).
Lusk Lumber Co. v. Independent Producers Consolidated, 35 Wyo. 381, 249 Pac.
790 (1926).

NOTES

the plan or purpose is fulfilled,2 2 and last, but not least, there must be a
23
benefit to the other party.
The burden of proving the existence of these required elements is
on the party who is invoking the protection of the doctrine of substantial
performance. 24 In order to get his case to the jury, he must present one that
25
is without willful omission or departure.
THE SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE

DOCTRINE

IN DISGUISE

The same or a similar result to the substantial performance doctrine
is sometimes achieved by manipulating other authoritative doctrines. If
for example, a court construes promises as being independent, the plaintiff
is not required to prove performance of his promise in order to recover
on the defendant's promise, and the defendant is not excused from performing because of a breach of plaintiff's promise. If the promises are
construed as dependent, that is as conditional promises, plaintiff to recover
must prove performance of his promise, but the doctrine of substantial
performance may be avaliable to the plaintiff so as to excuse a breach.
The doctrine of material and immaterial breach used by some courts
appear to be an application of the substantial performance doctrine under
another name. In allowing recovery on the contract for an immaterial
breach not going to the essence, 26 the court is just applying a test that is
the converse of the test applied in the substantial performance doctrine
and reaches the same results. That is, the court is saying that there has
been no material breach (and hence there has been substantial performance) of plaintiff's promise. Thus the tests used to determine if a breach
is immaterial and not of the essence could in reality be said to be a part
of the test for substanital performance.
However, the doctrine of
immaterial breach may be helpful in reaching a fair result in those
situations in which at the time of breach plaintiff has not perfomed
even in part but has expended considerable effort to prepare for performance.
APPLICATION

OF

DOCTRINE

The doctrine of substantial performance is not limited to construction
or building contracts even though the doctrine reached fruition and is
generally applied in this area. In a 1926 Wyoming case, 27 the court,
quoting Willston on Contracts, Section 805, said:
22.
23.

Richard v. Miller, 182 Cal. 351, 188 Pac. 50 (1920).
Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834).
But see where in Ylijarvi v. Brockphaler, 213
Minn. 385, 7 N.W.2d 314, 319 (1942), the court said:

• . . The mere fact that a part performance has been beneficial is not enough
to render the party benefited liable to pay for the advantage. It must appear
that he has taken the benefit tinder circumstances sufficient to raise an implied
promise to pay for the work done, notwithstanding the nonperformance of the
special contract.

24.
25.
26.
27.

De Vito v. Uto, 253 Mass. 239, 148 N.E. 456 (1925).
Williard Sales and Service Co. v. Stevens, 167 Pa. Super. 621, 76 A.2d 225 (1950).
Sipley v. Stickney, 190 Mass. 43, 76 N.E. 226 (1906).
Lusk Lumber Co. v. Independent Producers Consolidated, 35 Wyo. 381, 249 Pac.
790

(1926).
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The doctrine of substantial performance is not confined to building contracts. The reasons underlying the doctrine make it
applicable to all cases where it would be unjust to the plaintiff
to declare a forfeiture of his work and materials.
Page on Contracts,

28

is to the effect that the doctrine of substantial per-

formance is by no means limited to building contracts. If any contract
is perfomed substantially, recovery can be had thereon, subject to recoupment of damages, if any, by the other party.
Besides being used in building and construction contracts, the doctrine
of substantial performance has been applied in contracts involving specially
manufactured chattels; 2 9 sale of real estate in special circumstances; 30
32
personal performance; 3 1 and sale of goods.
UNDER THE UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL

CODE-NON-INSTALLMENT

CONTRACTS

If in a non-installment contract for the sale of goods, the goods or
tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract, the
buyer under the U.C.C. has his option of rejecting the whole, accepting
the whole, or accepting any commercial unit or units and rejecting the
rest. 33 Inasmuch as the buyer is able to reject the goods or delivery for
failure in any respect to conform to the contract, a substantial performance on the part of the seller will be of no avail to him. However,
the :buyer's rejection must in compliance with Section 2-602 (1) which
requires a rejection to be made within a reasonable time after delivery or
tender, and the seller must be seasonably notified. Also, if a defect is
ascertainable by reasonable inspection and the buyer wants to rely on this
defect to justify his rejection, under Section 2-605 the buyer must state
and specify this particular defect in connection with his rejection if the
defect is one which the seller could have cured if he had been seasonably
notified or if he has asked the buyer to list in writing all defects on which
he proposes to rely. However, if the buyer should choose either of two
options that are left to him, accept the whole or accept any commercial
unit or units and reject the rest,3 4 and then try to revoke his acceptance
of a lot or commercial unit,3 5 the substantiality of the seller's performance
would become a prime consideration in determining if the buyer can
revoke his acceptance and refuse to keep the goods. If a buyer has
accepted non-conforming goods under the assumption the non-conformity
would be cured and it has not, or if the buyer's acceptance was made
without discovery of the non-conformity because of the difficulty of
28.
29.
30.
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.

3 Page, Contracts, § 2147.
Harrild v. Spokane School Dist., 112 Wash. 266, 192 Pac. 1 (1920).
Froedtert v. Haines, 142 F.2d 338 (1944).

Northwestern Theatrical Ass'n. v. Hannigan, 218 F. 359 (2nd Cir. 1914).
Britton
v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1934).
J & L Steel Co. v. Abner Doble Co., 162 Cal. 497, 123 Pac. 290 (1912) ; Lusk Lumber
Co. v. Independent Producers Consolidated, 35 Wyo. 381, 249 Pac. 190 (1926);
Mark v. Stuart-Howland Co., 226 Mass. 35, 115 N.E. 42 (1917).
Uniform Commercial Code, 1958, Official Text with Comments, § 2-601.
Ibid.
Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-608.

NoTEs

discovery or because of the seller's assurnaces, he can revoke his acceptance
if the non-conformity substantially impairs the value of the lot or commercial unit to him. 30 Taking the converse of Section 2-608 and say if
even with the non-conformity the goods or commercial unit still give
substantial value to the buyer, he cannot revoke an acceptance made
under the assumptions allowed in this section. 3 7 In this type of situation
a seller would be able to invoke the doctrine of substantial performance
for his protection and a buyer would be unable to revoke his acceptance.
This is the only situation or section dealing with non-installment sales
contracts that allows for the application of the substantial performance
doctrine.
Also, under the loose and liberal language used in Section 2-601, if a
time for delivery is contained or set forth in the contract and if the seller
should fail to meet this date or time in any respect, the buyer can reject the
entire contract if he so chooses. The harsh and unjust result of this
type of rejection by the buyer was frequently overcome by the courts under
the modern common law by holding that "time is not ordinarily of the
essence of the contract, unless the contract expressly so declares, or unless
from the subject-matter or nature of the contract, . . . it is apparent that the
parties so intended." 38 The U.C.C. appears to repect this doctrine and
allow rejection for any failure of delivery to meet the time requirement
regardless of how slight. However, Section 2-615 does excuse a delay or
non-delivery by a seller, where performances was made impractical by
the occurrence of a contingency, the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption of the parties in making the contract or the seller is complying
in good faith with a foreign or domestic governmental regulation. The
seller must seasonably notify the buyer of the delay or non-delivery and
if only part of seller's capacity is effected, he must make fair and reasonable
allocations among his customers. Also, under Section 2-601 the parties
can agree that some defect, or conduct by the seller, such as delay in
delivery will not constitute a non-conformity and thus the seller by appropriate drafting can avoid the severe consequences following from Section
2-601 in the event of a non-conforming delivery that does not substantially
impair the value of the performance. Thus, parties can, if they so
intend, incorporate the substantial performance doctrine into their contracts.
Section 2-601 of the U.C.C. allows a buyer who is not harmed or
injured by a seller's late delivery to place a serious and significant injury
or loss upon the seller. This will especially be true under circumstances
in which the market price for the goods has taken a large drop and time
was not of the essence, or the goods are unique and specially manufactured
goods. This is an example of where the burden is placed on the seller by
the inflexible rule set down by the code, and if the substantial performance
36.
37.

Ibid.
Ibid.

38.

Walker v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 229 Mo. App. 1202, 70 S.W.2d 82 (1934).
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doctrine were applied, which is very flexible, we could place the burden
where justice and equity under the facts of the particular case required that
it be placed. The harshness of the code in this situation can also be
alleviated by the parties themselves, if they have adequate knowledge of
the law and through proper draftsmanship shape their own remedies to
their particular requirements as they are allowed to do under Section 2-719.
These provisions for shifting the burden by draftmanship will be of no
avail though to the unwary and unexperienced working under the code.
When the buyer has accepted any lot or commercial unit, he must
pay the seller at the contract rate for these goods even though they do not
conform to the contract.39 If the buyer has accepted and given notice of
the non-conformity as required by Section 2-607, he can recover damages
for any loss that results naturally out of the non-conformity, 40 and also
his incidental and consequential damages that result from the seller's
41
breach.
The seller is offered some relief under Section 2-508 which allows the
seller to cure the non-conformity if time for performance has not yet
expired and he can do so within the contract time. This provision is
beneficial to the seller, but is very limited in application from the viewpoint of the time limitation. Also, under this same section, subsection (2),
the seller is protected from a surprise rejection if he had reasonable
grounds on which to believe the tender would be acceptable to the buyer
and the time for performance has not yet expired. In this situation if the
seller notifies the buyer, he will be allowed a reasonable time within which
ie can make a conforming tender.
UNDER

THE

UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL

CODE-INSTALLMENT

CONTRACTS

An installment contract under the U.C.C. is one which requires or
authorizes the delivery of goods in separate lots to be separately accepted.
In an installment contract, the buyer may reject any non-conforming
installment which substantially impairs the value of that installment and
cannot be cured; or if the non-conformity is a defect in the required
documents, the buyer can reject the installment. 42 If the non-conformity
can be cured, though, and the seller gives the buyer adequate assurance
that it will be cured, the buyer must accept that installment. 41 From this
we can see that in an installment contract, if the seller has substantially
performed his part of the contract, the buyer must accept that part of the
installment so performed. This is different than a non-installment con,tract, as there, the buyer can reject at his option for any non-conformity
at all. The foregoing pertains only to the non-conforming installment,
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Uniform Commercial Cole, § 2-607 (1), but also note that subsection (2) states
that acceptance will not impair any other remedy by this article, and this acts as a
bridge to get us into section cited in the next two footnotes.
Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-714.
Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-715.
Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-612.
Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-612. See Comment 5 of this section for an illustration of "adequate assurance" and "cure" in this context.

NOTES

but whenever the non-conformity or default with respect to one or more
installments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract, the
buyer can treat the entire contract as breached and cancelled. 4 4 This
again requires a substantial impairment of the value of the whole contract
before the buyer can reject or rescind the whole contract. However, if
comment 4 to Section 2-612 is to be believed as read in connection with
Section 2-102 (3) the burden of draftsmanship can also become involved.
Since the provision of this Act can be varied by agreement between the
parties as qualified and restricted by subsection 3 of Section 2-102, the
parties can agree what will and what will not be a substantial non-conformity so as to allow a rejection of the goods.
Whether or not the substantial performance doctrine will be applied
as it was developed prior to the code depends upon the court's interpretation of the phrase, "substantially impairs the value of that installment,"
and also the type of contract involved. As was stated previously in this
article, one of the principal tests to see if there has been a substantial
performance is if the essential particulars of the contract are met so the
buyer's plan or purpose is fulfilled. If this is the interpretation to be used
by the courts, in this context, the substantial performance doctrine is in
effect incorporated into Section 2-612. A problem in this regard is to
determine the meaning of the term "value" as used in Section 2-612.
"Value" as defined in Section 1-201 is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. This definition would be of no use as the word is
used in Section 2-612. In Section 2-724 the term "value" is used in
reference to market price, and in Section 2-608 "value" is qualified and
means the value to the buyer. Although "value" as used in Section 2-612
is not specifically qualified, it apparently refers to "value" to the buyer
and may be very similar to the requirement in the substantial performance
doctrine that all the essential particulars of the contract must be met so
the buyer's plan or purpose is fulfilled. Comment 4 to Section 2-612 substanties this in saying impairment of value can turn not only on the
quality of good, but also on factors like time, quantity, assortment and
the like.
Conceivably the term "value" might refer to market value and in a
contract where the goods are being purchased by a retailer for resale on
the market, the "substantial impairment of the market value" would be
an adequate test and would result in giving the buyer substantially what he
had bargained for. But, in still another type of contract, this interpretation of the word "value" would be disastrous to the buyer. This would
be in the situation where the buyer is a manufacturer or assembler and
uses the goods purchased as component parts. Here the buyer may have
his tolerance limits set so tight that only exact performance would meet
his needs or purposes and yet there may still be other manufacturers or
assembers whose tolerances are not as tight as the present buyer's. Thus,
44.

Ibid.

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

there would still be a market for the goods and their market value would
not be impaired by the seller failing to meet the buyer's precise requirements, and yet the goods are absolutely useless to the buyer for his
specific purposes. If the court said "value" meant market value, the
buyer would be obligated to take goods absolutely useless to him. In this
situation the buyer can possibly sustain losses from 'two different causes.
If he resells the goods on the market and the market price is lower than
his contract price, he will sustain a loss. The more serious loss or detriment
to the buyer will be his expenses and time loss in securing replacement
good to use in his manufacturing process.
The above situation is just the converse of the seller's situation in a
non-installment contract involving specially manufactured goods. This
may tend to show why the buyer should be given the right to reject in
non-installment contracts, but is there any real justification of why this
right should not extend to installment contracts, too? I think the real
significance of this conflict is that it tends to point out the inconsistency
of the U.C.C. in its treatment of installment and non-installment contracts
where there is no real justification for such distinction. In other words,
the U.C.C. generalizes too broadly and is not flexible enough to handle the
many different situations that will arise under both types of contracts. In
determiningt he consequence of a defect, it is necessary to make refinements
as to to:
1. Defect in time of delivery
2. Defect in goods
3. Specially manufactured goods
a. Buyer's standpoint in that they may or may not have to meet
precise specifications
b. Seller's standpoint in that there is no other market for such
goods
rather than making a determination upon whether the contract involved
is an installment or non-installment contract.
If there has been an installment or installments which substantially
impair the whole contract and the buyer has accepted these without
notifying the seller he chose to cancel the contract, the contract is reinstated. Or if the buyer brings an action only for the past installments or
demands performance from the seller in regard to future installments, the
contract is also reinstated.4 5 Thus, even though there has been a substantial breach of the contract, and the contract is cancelled by the buyer's
conduct, the contract can be reinstated and remain in effect. But, still,
before the breach can be sufficient to cancel the entire contract, it must
46
substantially impair the value of the whole contract.
45.
46.

Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-612.
Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-612, Comment 6, 3rd sentence and § 2-610, Comment 1, 1st sentence. By reading comments to the two sections in conjunction
with each other we get some insight as to the objectives of the draftsman in this
area, which appears to substitute "objective test" for "subjective test" in determing buyer's right to cancel entire remaining portions of contract because of one

NOTES
APPRAISAL OF THE CODE DOCTRINE

Comparing the doctrine of substantial performance as developed outside of the code with the code provisions relating to the comparable
problem as it arises in non-installment contracts, the code appears to be a
reversion to the common law requiring strict performance if the parties to
the agreement have not "otherwise agreed." This will tend to reinstate
the exact thing the courts were trying to alleviate by introducing doctrine
of substantial performance. Although the buyer is given an option of
accepting or rejecting a non-complying performance by the seller, this is
still almost identical to the common law requiring strict performance
and holding liberal performance (including time of performance) to be of
the essence. The buyer can reject if he so chooses for failure in any
respect to conform to the contract. If the buyer chooses this option and
rejects in the proper manner, it is the same as requiring the seller to make
a complete and perfect performance on his part before he is entitled to any
compensation on the contract. The seller only has a remedy if the buyer
wrongfully rejects or revokes acceptance or fails to make a payment when
due, 47 or if he finds the buyer insolvent. 4s Thus, for a substantial performance on a non-installment contract, with a defect, however slight, the
seller has no remedy if the buyer chooses to reject. This is not too harmful
to a seller if there is a wide and open market for the contract goods. He
can get them back, as it is wrongful for the buyer to exercise any ownership
over goods that have been rejected. 49 The greatest harm and injustice
will result in goods that are specially manufactured with a slight and
unsubstantial defect. A rejection by a buyer in this situation would cause
the seller a great loss and injustice. This is just the thing the substantial
performance doctrine is supposed to prevent in its proper application.
Although this is something that will not happen in every case, it can
happen if an insistent buyer so chooses.

This power of choice should not

be given to a buyer, but should remain with the courts so they can allow
the seller -to invoke the doctrine of substantial performance if the merits
of the case so allow.
In the installment contracts, the U.C.C. makes the basis for rejection
of the goods or lot the substantiality of the impairment to the value of the
installment or the contract. With the use of the word "value" in Section
2-612 and the various interpretations available and with no assurance of

which one the court may choose to use, we could conclude that if the
drafters were trying to incorporate the substantial performance doctrine,
they could have selected more apt words.
Assuming by proper draftsmanship the parties to an installment
contract could either invoke or exclude the substantial performance doctrine

47.
48.
49.

defect in seller's performance.
Whether draftsmens' method of seeking this
objective is sound is a serious question, but at least they did have an objective in
mind.
Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-703.
Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-702.
Ibid.

188
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by so agreeing, we are faced by another question. Was it sound legislative
policy to change the present law in this fashion merely in order to accord
the parties the right to choose their own rules?
Inherent in this question are these:
1. Analytically, could not the same result have been reached more
directly by preserving the present law insofar as an agreement was silent
on this point?
2. As a matter of legislative policy, are the social costs of re-education
of the profession and public (which re-education may often involve learning through bitter experience) justified in view of the limited results
produced?
3. As a matter of legislative policy, are the "new rules" more apt to
produce "justice" for -the unwary than the "old rules"?
ROBERT

D.

OLSON

